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ARGUMENT
I.

Determinations of Disputed Materia.
;es ...: Fa^L aid
Improper in a Summary Judgment Pro*.
..g, So Appellant ^s
Not Required to Marshal the Evidence ^n Support :f the
Di sr>11t e*rl Tnnrr>per Findings ^ f "^a cf
.: ..-o important to note that this case was disposed of by

the trial court in a summary judgment proceeding.
for si immar \

ji; i i g m e n t , a t:i :i a 1

"On a motion

i i : t: w e i g h

disputed

evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues
of fact exis'
1

J

Draper City v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888

"

II 9 95)

statement uiia^ _.d*

' [I] t: : i :i ] "} !::•= .] ;: = =

: •: :L E , s\ , :)j : i: i

::o dispute the averments on the ..other side

of :he controversy <tnd create an issue of fact. . . . ''Summary
* * i'r.:---r*

,.- .

gener a] 1 y consi dered a di asti c i e •

' ai id

is appropriate oni:. ^rien the facts are clear and undisputed."
Id. a: 11C1

(quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181

v Jtah

1 In Draper City, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial
court's grant of summary judgment because there were confli cting
swor:. .--:-- •-- •: .

. ; *-. ilH.d iosi.it'. ''I !iiial["jridl idcL L lid L had Lo

be resolved at trial.

Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1101.

Similarly,

the Affidavit of Linda Majors herein creates issues of material
fact regard i.nq I li»' i »'presented: 11 it; nudf

IM I ' d

dl i

i iiuni'i

the circumstances surrounding her execution of the subject
purchase agreement.
I
disputed issues of material fact in a summary judgment
proceeding.

Therefore, in order for an appellant to challenge
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ind

such an improper resolution of factual issues on appeal, it is
not necessary for the appellant to marshal all of the evidence in
support of a trial court's improper findings of fact.
Plaintiff misstates the law on this point.

Plaintiff's

argument regarding the marshaling of evidence applies only when
findings of fact have been made by a judge or a jury after a
trial has been conducted.

Both of the cases cited by Plaintiff

on this point address findings of fact made after trial.

See

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991); Ohline Corp. v.
Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
II.

Material Issues of Fact Preclude the Grant of Summary
Judgment Herein.
In summary judgment proceedings, "[d]oubts, uncertainties or

inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment", Defendant
herein.

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin,

Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) .
"Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court
before judgment can be rendered against them . . . .
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility."
1261.

The trial
Id. at

"[S]ummary judgment may be inappropriate even if the

defendant fails to properly respond to the motion."

TS 1

Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In Mountain States Telephone, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment even though no
affidavits were filed in opposition thereto.

The Utah Supreme

Court explained that the content of the findings of fact made by
dav c \client3\ma;jors\reply brf
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the trial judge evidenced the existence of material issues of
fact precluding the grant of summary judgment.

Mountain States

Telephone, 681 P.2d at 1261.
Similarly, the contents of the findings of fact (both oral
and written) made herein by Judge Brian evidence the existence of
material issues of fact precluding summary judgment.

Examples of

Judge Brian's improper resolution of material factual issues were
given in Appellant's Brief at pp. 10-12.

Additionally, unlike

Mountain States Telephone, an opposing affidavit was actually
filed which specifically created material issues of fact
regarding the fraudulent representations made to Defendant to
induce her to execute the purchase agreement.
When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Defendant, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Defendant
was fraudulently induced to execute the purchase agreement.
Reasonable minds could also differ as to whether all of the
necessary elements of equitable estoppel are present.

Therefore,

the grant of summary judgment ordering specific performance of
the purchase contract was improper.

See, e.g., Olympus Hills

Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smiths Food & Drug Ctrs. , Inc., 889 P.2d
44 5, 44 9-54

(Utah Ct. App. 19 94) (summary judgment properly

denied because reasonable minds could differ based on evidence in
the record).
A.

Order of specific performance of purchase agreement is
improper on summary judgment.

The purchase agreement itself is not enforceable by
Plaintiff if Defendant's execution thereof was obtained by fraud.
dav c.\cliencs\ma]or3\reply.brf
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See, e.g.. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665-67 (Utah
1985).

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, Union Bank is directly

on point on this issue, and is controlling authority herein.

The

facts and issues in both Union Bank and the instant case are
identical--a party is attempting to use a summary judgment
proceeding to enforce a written contract and to exclude all
evidence of fraud in the inducement regarding the execution of
the written contract.
The trial court's factual finding that Defendant is merely
trying to avoid the purchase agreement due to "cold feet" [R. at
159] completely ignores Defendant's right to elect to rescind the
purchase agreement or to affirm it and recover damages.

See,

e.g., Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Fraud in the inducement was specifically raised by Defendant
as an affirmative defense in her answer, and was also argued in
detail in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
[R. at 154-60] .

Defendant also brought a counterclaim seeking to

quiet title, asserting misrepresentation and fraud
electing to rescind), and for slander of title.

(specifically

Defendant's

counterclaim was not specifically referenced in Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, and the hearing thereon only
addressed the fraud in the inducement argument in general.
Nevertheless, the trial court's grant of summary judgment
implicitly and necessarily constituted an adverse ruling on all
of the causes of action in Defendant's counterclaim because the
grant of summary judgment necessarily precludes the grant of any
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relief on Defendant's counterclaim.

See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851

P.2d 1178, 1181-82 (Utah 1993).
B.

Summary judgment is also improper based on Plaintiffs
estoppel theory.

The factual basis necessary for establishing virtually every
element of equitable estoppel is disputed herein, thereby
precluding summary judgment.

It is necessary for the trier of

fact to make findings of fact regarding each and every element
before judgment can be rendered on Plaintiff's equitable estoppel
claim.
1.

no inconsistent statement, act, etc.

There was no "statement, admission, act, or failure to act
by [Defendant] inconsistent with a claim later asserted."
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's communications with

Park City Title January 3-5, 1996 indicated an intent to close,
which is supposedly inconsistent with Defendant's later election
to rescind.

However, Defendant's actions have always been

consistent with her legal right to elect at any time to either
affirm the purchase agreement and recover damages or to rescind
the purchase agreement.

See Perkins, 769 P.2d at 271.

As set forth in the Affidavit of Linda Majors, 1M 19-22, at
p. 4 [R. at 134], when Defendant did not receive the purchase
price in cash within forty-eight hours as agreed, she was forced
to make other financial arrangements, she was no longer motivated
to sell the subject condominium, and upon advice of counsel she
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ultimately exercised her legal right to rescind the fraudulent
transaction.
Additionally, Defendant's courtesy in allowing Plaintiff to
stay in the subject condominium for one night in no way binds
Defendant as a matter of law to sell the subject condominium to
Plaintiff.

Mr. Knapp telephoned Defendant and explained that he

was in Park City and could not find a place to stay.

As

Defendant's condominium was not being used that night, she
graciously gave her consent for him to stay there overnight.

It

turns out that Plaintiff stayed nearly a week in Defendant's
condominium, free of charge, without her knowledge or consent.
2.

no reasonable reliance

Plaintiff did not take any action whatsoever in reasonable
reliance upon the alleged inconsistent conduct of Defendant.
Travelers, 896 P.2d at 647.

See

The only action allegedly taken by

Plaintiff is his travel to Utah and tender of timely performance
pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement.

However,

Plaintiff admits that he travelled to Utah and tendered timely
performance on or before January 3, 1996.
IV.C.l & 3, at p. 4.

See Brief of Appellee,

Plaintiff further admits that the alleged

inconsistent conduct of Defendant did not occur until January 45, 1996.

See Brief of Appellee, IV.C.5-7, at pp. 5-6.

Furthermore, it is apparent from the course of action taken by
Plaintiff thus far that Plaintiff would have attempted to close
on the purchase of the subject condominium even if Defendant had
refused to let him stay in the subject condominium at that time.

dav c \clients\ma]or3\reply brf
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Accordingly, Plaintiff did not take any action in reasonable
reliance upon the alleged inconsistent conduct of Defendant.
3.

no injury

Plaintiff has not established that he would be injured as a
result of Defendant's alleged inconsistent conduct.
Travelers, 896 P.2d at 647.

See

The injury Plaintiff claims to have

suffered is actually the result of the fraudulent conduct of Mr.
Knapp in inducing Defendant to execute the subject purchase
agreement.

Plaintiff is not entitled to compel specific

performance of the subject purchase agreement and Plaintiff's
injury is not properly attributable to Defendant's exercise of
her legal right to rescind a fraudulent transaction.
CONCLUSION
There are numerous issues of material fact that preclude the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this matter.
The trial court improperly resolved these factual disputes in a
summary judgment proceeding and also improperly refused to even
consider evidence of fraud in the inducement regarding
Defendant's execution of the subject purchase agreement.
Similar to the result in Union Bank, Defendant respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, and to remand this case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 14th day of November, 1996.
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